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to this committee, which had then discussed the matter and adjourned to continue the discussion that afternoon at 3 o'clock.
The meeting adjourned at 12.45 p. m. until December 22, 1921,
3 p.m.

FIFTH MEETING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 3 P. M.
PRESENT.

United States.-NI.r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
Mr. Wright and l\Ir. Clark.
British Ernpire.-~Ir. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New
Zealand), l\Ir. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice
Hankey, Capt. J.,ittle, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint.
France.--:--:l\Ir. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Oden'hal,
Mr. Ponsot.
Jtaly.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr.
Celesia di Vegliasco.
Japan.-Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato,
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. lchihashi a.nd Commander
Hori. ·
The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne.
Interpreter, l\lr. Camerlynck.
1. The fifth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American
Union Building at 3 p. m. Thursday, December 22, 1921.
2. The following· were present: For the United States, Mr.
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col.
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour,
Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir· E. Chatfield,
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for
India) ; for France, 1\Ir. Sarraut, 1\Ir. Jusserand, Vice Admiral
de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci,
Senator Albertini; Vice Admiral Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, l\Ir. Hanihara, Vice Admiral l(ato, Capt. Uyeda.
~- Secretaries and advisers present included: For the United
States, l\Ir. Wright, 1\Ir. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir
1\Iaurice flankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, ' Mr. Flint; for
France, ::\Ir. Kammerer, 1\Ir. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Pon-
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sot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, 1\ir. C~lesia di Vegliasco; for Japan, Mr.
Ichihashi, Commander Hori. The secretary general, accompanied
. by Mr. Paul and l\1r. Osborne, was present. Mr. Camerlynck
,yas present as interpreter.
4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, announced that the committee
'\vas ready to continue the discussion begun at the morning's
session.
Lord Lee said that, as he understood it, the present position
was one of agreement between the five powers in regard to the
ratio of capital ships, 'but t-hat all the powers were equally uncommitted on the subject of submarines, small craft, and auxiliaries. Hence he agreed with Admiral de Bon that it was justifiable to begin by clearing up the question of principle as to the
future of submarines. To the British Empire the question of
submarines was one of transcendent importance. He therefore
regretted that any difference of opinion should have arisen on
the subject and that submarines should have become the only
question on which the British delegation wa~ out of sympathy
with the American proposals', and, perhaps, also with the views of
France and other powers. He felt, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to explain and justify British opinion. He wished
to present as few figures as possible, but he felt it was necessary
to mention the following as the basis of his statement. The
figures as regards submarines '\Vere as follows :
,I

·I
Existing
tonnage.

The
American
proposals.

Amount of
new build:
ing permit ted
under the
American
proposaJs.

'90, 000
90,000
54,000

6,500
. 9,500
21,800

I

The United States of America .......... ·..........
Great Britain ...........•........................
Japan .... _.......................................
France .......... ~ ................................
Italy ............... : .............................
1

8\500
80,500.
32,200
28,360
18,250

-

In proportion.
1

(1)
(1)

(1)
(1)

--····--

He felt bound to say tha t it seemed to him very strange to put
before a Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments proposals designed to foster and increase the type of war vessels
which, according to the British view, was open to far more objection than surface capital ships. Moreover, it would be a certain
consequence, if submarines were retained, that the powers which
possessed large mercantile marines would be compelled to increase the numbers of their antisubmarine craft. This would give
but little relief to the overburdened taxpayer and would provide
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scant comfort to those WHO wished to abolish war and to make tt
less inhumane.
The view of the British Government and the British Empire
delegation was that what was required was not merely restriction
on submarines, but their total and final abolition. In explaining
the position he wished to make it clear that the British Empire
delegation had no unworthy or selfish motiYes. He would first
like to reply in advance, since this might be his only opportunity
of doing so, to the arguments .of the friends of the submarine.
He understood their first contention to be that the submarine was
the legitimate weapon of the weaker powers and was an effec.tive
and economical means of defense for an extensive coast line and
for maritime communications. Both these· standpoints could be
contested on technical grounds and, as he would show, were
clearly disproved by recent history. If some weak country possessed an exposed coast line, it would, of course, desire to defend
it against bombardment or the disembarkation of a military force.
It was necessary to ask, therefore, how such attacks were conducted in modern warfare. The reply was that they 'vere conducted by powerfully armed, swift-moving vessels, fully equipped
to resist submarine attack, and to escort and protect the convoys
of military transports. There was no branch of naval research
which had more closely engaged the attention of experts than the
counter offensive against the submarine. He was giving away n )
secrets when he stated that the methods of detection, of location,
as well as of destruction of submarines had progressed so muc h
further than the offensive power of the submarines themselves
that the latter had now already a reduced value against modern
surface warships. This, however, was bringing him into smnewhat technical subjects. During the late war Germany had (oncentrated her naval effort on the production and use of U-h·>ats
and had built up the most formidable submarine fleet tha the
world had ever seen before or since. He believed that Germany
had employed, in all, no less than 375 U-boats of 270,000 tons in
the aggregate. Of these, no less than 203 had been sunk. What
had these U-boats accomplished in legitimate naval warfare? It
was almost insignHicant. In the early part of the war a few obsolescent ships, which sometimes were not taking proper precautions, had been sunk, but the British Grand F'leet throughout the
war had not been affected ; riot one single ship had been sunk or
hit·by the action of submarines, whether at sea or in harbor. Its
surface squadrons had swept through all parts of the North Sea,
and wherever the sea had been clear of mine fields had gone
where they wished, undeterred by the submarine. Submarines had
not prevented the passage of troops across the sea. No less than
15,000,000 British troops had crossed and recrossed the English
{;bannel during the war, and not one man had been lost from the
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action of submarines except ori board hos.t)ital ships, which in the
twentieth century it had been deemed would be immune from the
attacks of submarines and therefore had not been escorted.
During the latter part of the war some 2,000,000 United States
troops had been brought across the Atlantic, and the submarine
had proved equally powerless to prevent them. In fact, the Uboat, whether considered as an offensive or defensive weapon,
against any sort of organized naval force had proved almost contemptible.
It had been maintained that submarines were useful for the
defense of coast lines and communications with colonies. He
gathered from the press that this was one of the arguments used,
and so it would have to be examined. If the argument was
sound, and if submarines were essential for this purpose, there
was no country which would need them so rriuch as the British
Empire, which possessed a coast line which, without wishing to
boast, he believed was almost as large as that of all the four
other powers present at this conference put together, and the
length of which was four times the circumference of. the globe,
and which, in addition, had the longest trade routes of any country to protect. It was partly because experience had shown that
they· were not effective ,for this -purpose that the British were
ready to abandon submarines. ~l'he late war had made it abundantly clear that the greatest peril to maritime communications
was the submarine, and that peril was specially great to a country which did not possess command of the sea on the surface.
Hence, it was to the interest of any such power to get rid of this
terrible menace. And in this connection it must be remembered
that the submarine was of no value as a defense against submarines. It was against merchant ships alone that they achieved
real success.
It would be as well to recall what the German SlJbmarine fleet
had accomplished against mercantile marines. No less than
12,000,000 tons of shipping had been sunk, of a value of $1,100,000,000, apart from their cargoes. Over 20,000 noncombatantsmen, women, and children-had been drowned. It was true that
this action had been undertaken in violation of all laws, both
human and divine. The German excuse for it had been its effectiveness. They had used the same argument in the case of
poison gas, which had set a precedent for unscrupulous nations,
which appeared likely to endure for all time now that nations
had been driven to resort to it. .The menace of the submarine
could only be got rid of by its total banishment from the ·sea.
That was the intention of the treaty of Versailles, which had forbidden Germany to construct submarines, whether for military or
Inercantile pu.rposes. Was it to be assumed, Lord Lee continued,
that Germany was always to be bad and the other powers were
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always to be go~d? Was there to be one rule for Germany and
another rule for the rest of the world? In saying this be was
not casting any reflection on any nation, and least of all on the
officers and men of the submarine fleets. These men were the
pick of their service, gallant and high-minded men, but they were
obliged to obey orders; and experience had shown that occasionally governments could go mad. The view of the British Empire
delegation, therefore, was that the only proper course was the
abolition of submarines. Their limitation was not suffici{mt.
Another objection to limitation was that a submarine fleet could
so very rapidly be expanded in time of war. Submarin~s could
only be built if the industry were kept alive, and personnel could
only be provided if a trained nucleus existed. Hence it was only
by means of abolition that this menace to the mercantile marine
of the world could be got rid of. He had said earlier in his
remarks that the British delegation were animated by no selfish
motives. At the same time it would be foolish not to recognize
that Great Britain was the nation most exposed to the menace of
the submarine. So long as submarine warfare continued it
would be the greatest menace ·to the food supplies on which that
country was dependent.
The British people live<r in a crowded island whose soil only
produced two-fifths of its supply of food. For the remaining
three-fifths they relied upon sea communications. On an ayerage
only seven weeks' stocks were maintained in the country. By far
the greatest anxiety which the British Government had felt during the war was to prevent the reserves of food falling to zero.
'Vas it surprising, therefore, if, with a danger in front of them
as great as any to which Mr. Briand had so eloquently explained
France was subject, the British people protested against a weapon
which was the negation of humanity, chivalry, and civilization
itself? 'l,here were some people who said it was this vulnerability
of Great Britain which justified the retention of the submarine,
since it was by these means alone that the British Empire could
be stricken down. The late war had shown, however, that the
British Empire was not easily stricken down, and, if war should
ever come again, he imagined that means would be found for
Great Britain to save itself from starvation. But, it might be
claimed, if the TJ-boat had begun its operations earlier or had had
better luck, the result might have been different. To this he
would reply that the British Navy had constituted the keystone of
the allied arch; but for the British Navy France would have been
ruined, Belgium and Holland would have been overrun, and even
the United States of America, self-contained, self-supporting, with
all its vast resources, would have been impotent to intervene and
might have had to abandon its Army and all that it had in France,
or else to make a humiliating peace.
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That would not have been a disadter to Great Britain alone.
That was why he resented the idea, which had been published in a
part of the press, that the British plea for the abolition of submarines was merely a selfish and unworthy design. It had been
suggested that the conditions of the late war might never recur.
Could France be so sure of this? Could France run th~ risk of
a disaster to her near neighbor, and only certain ally, if the situation of 1914 were ever reproduced? It was necessary to take long
vie,vs in this matter, a_nd the British Empire delegation believed
that they were fighting the battle, not only of the allied and associated powers, but of the ~whole civilized world in advocating the
abolition of the submarine.
He felt sure that some one ·would ask, How can we feel sure
that, if we abolish submarines, other po·wers who are not represented here will not proceed with the building of submarines?
The same question might be asked as to the oth~r classes of craft
mentioned in the American scheme. He found it impossible to
believe that other powers would set themselves against the opinion
of the rest of the civilized world regarding this particular weapon.
If, however, the great naval powers should at some future date
find themselves exposed to piracy by the action of some smaller
power, surely they would find the means o~ bringing Nemesis to
the transgressor. World opinion was a very powerful weapon,
and certainly some means would be found by which the great
naval powers could protect themselves if necessary. It was said
that submarines were a cheap method of warfare. Surely this
conference did not desire to make war cheap? When war had
been cheap it had been almost continuous. He hoped the submarine ·would not be defended because it_ would be a weapon
within the reach of all. It might perhaps be cheap for the
aggressor, but it was not so for the victim.
The average number of German submarines operating at any
one time on the Atlantic approaches to France and Great Britain
during the late vvar had not been more than nine or ten, but Great
Britian had had to maintain an average of no less than ~,000
antisubmarine surface craft in order to deal with these. It could
be seen, therefore, that it was a very expensive form of war for
the defender. The British' Empire delegation were anxious to
contribute to,vard the ideals of the present conference. They desired not only a limitation of armaments but also a limitation or
expenditures, which constituted so great a burden in time of
peace. That 'vas why Great Britain, which had the tradition of
posses-sing the greatest navy, had welcomed the· proposals for
curbing capital ships. What would be gained, however, if this
competition were merely transferred to submarines? Uertalnly
not much, and meanwhile the submarine threatened Great
Britain's very life and existence. But, if the submarine were

LIMITED WEAPON.

53

abolished, the British Empire delegation could accept, with modifications in detail, practically the whole of the American proposals in regard to the lightening of these burdens.
Lord Lee said he was not impressed with the argument that
because it was found impossible to deal effectively with poison
gas or air bombs, which were by-products of essential industries,
it would be impossible to deal with the submarine. The submarine was not a by-product of, any industry, but was essentially
an offensive weapon. He, therefore, said that it could be, and
ought to be, abolished. It was a weapon of murder and _piracy,
involving the drowning of noncombatants. It had been ·used to
sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships.
Technically the submarine was so constructed that it could not
be utilized to rescue even women and chi~dren from sinking ships.
That was why he hoped that the conference would not give it a
new lease of life.
He had endeavored to prove that the submarine was only to a
limited extent a weapon of defense, that for offense it was only
really valuable when used against merchant ships, and that it
constituted the greatest peril to which the mercantile marine of
the 'vorld was exposed. For defense he did not say it was wholly
useless, but merely inefficient, and that its disadvantages greatly
exceeded its advantages except for war on the mercantile marine.
The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the conference was asked to give-he would not say a license, but permission to thrive and multiply. It would be a great disappointment
if the British Empire delegation failed to persuade the conference
to get rid of this weapon, which involved so much evil to peoples
who live on or by the sea.
To show the earnestness of the British Government in this matter, Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest
and probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, composed of 100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap
the whole of this great fleet, to disband the personnel, provided
the other powers would do the same. That was the British offer
to the world, and he believed it was a greater contribution to the
cause of humanity than even the limitation of capital ships.
However, it was useless to be blind to the facts of the position,
and he hardly hoped to carry with him all the powers present at
that table, though he believed that in the end all civilized powers
would come round to the British point of view. In any event, the
British Empire delegation did not intend that the settlement in
regard to capital ships should be affected if they failed to carry
their point in regard to the abolition of submarines. Should he
fail to convince his colleagues he would nevertheless welcome any
suggestions for the reduction and restriction of submarines which
they might like to make, and, in particular, he would await with
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the greatest interest the proposals of his French colleagues, which
had been promised earlier in the day.
The chairman said that he did not intend then to comment upon
the very able and powerful argument of Lord Lee, to which the
members of the committee had had the privilege of listening, but
he merely wished to interpolate a statement giving the figures
supplied by the American naval experts and upon which the
Am.erican proposal was based, concerning the submarine tonnage
built and building, since these figures did not appear to coincide
with those referred to by Lord ·Lee. According to the American
figures, this t9nnage was as follows :
United States-------------------------------------Great Britain-------------~-----------------------France-------------------------------------------Italy---------·---------------.:..--------------------J'apan __·-------------------------------------------

Tons.
95, 000
82,464
42,850
20, 228
31, 400

The United States had, . therefore, 95,000 tons, which it was
prepared to reduce. The .reduction was slight. But it was a
reduction. It was, of course, not the intention to increase but to
reduce.
Lord Lee said that he regretted if any of the figures he had
given had been inaccurate.
Mr. Sarraut said the British Government had shown clearly its
views regarding submarines; he then read the following declaration of the views of the French Government :
"The French Government has already set forth its views with
regard to the .question of submarines, first, during the discussions preliminary to the treaty of Versailles and also before the
League of Nations, when the representative of the British Gove.rnment opposed the granting of submarines to the small Baltic
powers. In both of these instances the point of view favoring the
inclusion of submarines in the naval forces of States met with
the almost unanimous approval of the various Governments rep·resented.
"France believes that the submarine is the only weapon which
at present permits a nation scantily supplied with capital ships
to defend itself at sea. For France, tb,erefore, the submarine
is an essential means of preserving her independence which she
can not give up, especially in view of the sacrifices to which
she has been asked to consent in the matter of ~apital ships.
Moreover, in the present state of the development of naval science
the submarine can not suffice to assure the control of the seas
to a belligerent, even if that belligerent possesses a great superiority in submarines. It is not, therefore, a weapon making for
supremacy.
"The French Government believes that every method of warfare may or may not be employed in conformity with the law3
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of war and that the inhuman · and barbarous use made of the
submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason for condemning that belligerent but not for condemning the submarine.
"As submarines are particularly subject to withdrawal from
service in war time, the restriction within a certain limit of the
total tonnage of these vessels which a maritime nation may build
would have to a lesser degree the same effect as their total abolition, and should be declined for the same reasons.
·"The French Government has already stated that it can not
accept an agreement based on the principle that the total tonnage
of submarines which a nation may build should be in direct
proportion to the capital ship tonnage of that nation. In its
opinion, the contrary point of view is the rational one, since a
nation would be deprived of the protection which would be
afforded her by capital ships.
"The French Government believes that it is possible to reconcile the use of submarines with the laws of humanity. From this
point of view large submarines have the advantage of being able
to rescue the crews of torpedoed vessels or to furnish prize crews
to captured vessels.
"Tbe French Government is obliged to assume eventually the
defense of its numerous colonies, some of which are far distant
from the mother country. In view of this fact and also in order
to safeguard its lines of communication with the colonies it must
possess submarines with a very large cruising radius and consequently with appropriate dimensions.
"For these reasons the French Government can not consent
to accept either the abolition of submarines or a reduction of
the total tonnage of submarines which it considers to be the
irreducible minimum necessary to assure the safety of the territories for which it is responsible, or a limitation of the individual
tonnage of submarines ..,,
Senator Schanzer said he had listened with the greatest attention and sympathy to Lord Lee's important speech.
·
In the name of the Italian delegation he wished to declare his
great sympathy with anything that could make ,war less inhuman.
The Italian delegate in the subcommittee for poison gas, in
this same conference, had proposed the abolition of the use of
poison gas in warfare. The submarine question was mainly one
of a technical nature. Lord Lee had asserted that submarines
were not an efficient means of defense. The Italian naval experts did not share this opinion. They thought that the submarine was still an indispensable weapon for the defense of the
Italian coasts, which had a very great extent and along 'vhich
some of the largest cities, the principal railways, and a number
of the most important industrial establishments were situated.
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The Italian naval experts were furthermore of the opinion that
submarines vvere necessary to protect the lines of communication of their country, vvhich for the greater part · depended upon
the sea for its supplies. The Italian delegation was not ready
at that time to resolve these questions of a technical character.
Senator Schanzer venture~ to observe, moreover, that the Italian delegation did not think this conference, in which only five
powers were repr~sented, could settle the question of submarineswhich concerned many other powers not represented -here. For
these reasons, and in spite of its appreciation of the humanitarian arguments brought forward by Lord Lee, the Italian delegation were not in a position at the present time to associate
themselves with the proposal for the abolition of submarines
and were not authorized to do so.
Mr. Hanihara said that he had listened with great interest to
the able and highly instructive and impressive argument of
Lord Lee for the abolition of submarines: The Japanese delegation yielded to none in condemning such atrocious and lawless
use of submarines as was resorted to by Gerll?-any in the late
war. They believed that the sinking of merchant vessels without
proper warning had no justification vvhatever, and they felt
called upon to insist on such international rules as would effectively prevent the future recurrence of similar barbarious acts
from submarines. Such was the conviction of the Japanese delegation.
However, as legitimate defensive weapons, submarines did
not, in the opinion of the Japanese delegation, materially differ
from destroyers. The popular idea was that submarines menaced and sank peaceful merchant marines without warning·;
their legitimate uses were apparently lost sight of. Submarines
in their legitimate employment were no more atrocious than
poison gas or air bombs. Moreover, when employed as a means
.of coast defense, submarines were like movable mines and thus
constituted an effective defensive weapon. Of course, the unrestricted use of mines against merchant ships in the open sea
would be as· dangerous as the sinking of ships without warning
by submarines.
1\fr. Hanihara said he thought it was clear from these observations that submarines could not be considered as an illegiti~ate
weapon. Any weapon might become illegitimate if used without
restriction. For the protection of an insular nation like Japan
submarines were relatively inexpensive and yet effective; but the
Japanese delegation would insist, at the same time, upon more
vigorous international rules governing their proper uses. The recurrence of cruelties committed by submarines during the recent
war should by all means be avoided.
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The chairman , obserYed that, as had been indicated by the
remarks of the delegates, he thought that all .~ould not fail to be
deeply impressed by the statement of Lord Lee, supported as it
\vas by. the Yery definite statement of facts as to the u~e of submarines. He thought that one clear and definite point of view
-emerged on which all were agreed, namely, that there ·was no
disposition to tolerate on any plea of necessity the illegal use
()f the submarine as practiced in the late war and that the~e
.should be no difficulty in preparing and announcing to the world a
statement of the intention of the nations represented at the conference that submarines must observe the well-established prineiples of international law regarding visit and search in attacks
on merchant ships. ~fuch could be done in clarifying this position and in defining \Vhat uses of subm.arines were considered
.contrary to humanity and to the well-defined principles of international la\V. The recommendation might go further, not only
regarding what were conceived to be the rules regarding use of
submarines but also what the limitations upon their use should be.
The chairman understo9d that the crux of the controversy was
as to the us.e of the submarine as a weapon of defense. Lord Lee
had said that it was of little value as such, and hence that its
.continued use should not be tolerated. Lord Lee had I,>oi~ted
-Out --that there were only five nations present. The chairman
could not agree, however, that these were in . the same position
regarding submarines as they were regarding capital ships, since
in the nlatter of capital ships they represented the potency of comJ>etiticn, whereas when dealing with submarines-~ more cheaply
1nade weapon-they were dealing with what other. nations could
_produce, if they chose. Even if they \yere ready to adopt the princ:ple suggested by the British delegation, they would still have to
.await the adherence of other nations.
Upon the question whether the submarine was o~ value for
.defense, each nation must take the opinion of its naval experts.
Indications of differences of opinion had already been manifested.
He would not at this time make any announcement of the position of the United States, except to add to the expressions of
detestation of the abuse of the submarine and of the methodsthe illegal methods, as they have been continually called-of their
employment during the war.
He wished, however, to read a report. The President bad apJlointed an Advisory ·Committee to aid the American delegation .
.,..rhe members of that comn1ittee were gathered together, men and
women, from all fields of activity, from al_l parts of the country,
and represented every shade o~ public opinion. That committee
lmd considered this subject, and the subcommittee to which it was
25882-23--5
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referred was headed by a distinguished admiral of the American
Navy. The report was debated in full committee and was unanimously adopted-even by those who were prepossessed against the
submarine. He read this report, not as an opinion of the American Government, but as a report of the Advisory Committee, which
was created in order that the American delegates might be advised as to public opinion.
The chairman then read the following report on submarines
adopted by the Advisory Committee of the American delegation
on December 1, 1921:
"In the recent World War the submarine was used in four general ways:
- " (a) Unlimited use against both enemy and neutral noncombatant merchant vessels.
" (b) Use against enemy combatant vessels.
" (c) Use as mine planters.
" (d) Use as scouts.
·'.'Whatever is said about unlimited warfare by submarines is
also true of unlimited warfare by surface craft, provided the combatant wishes to violate the rules of war. The confederate
cruisers destroyed all property, but not lives. The English expected the Germans in the latter part of the 'Vorld War to use
surface craft for unlimited warfare, and had provided means , to
offset this: However, the Germans, with one exception, were: unable· to get out of the North Sea; The Moewe, a surface ship,
sank almost ·an merchantmen that she came into contact with,.
saving the lfves of the crews. So that unlimited warfare is not
necessarily an attribute of the submarine alone.
· "·submari1{es 'against c01nmerce.-The unlimited· use of submarines by Germany against commerce brought down upon her the·
wrath of the world, solidified it against the common enemy, and
was un'd oubtedly- "tlH:! popular cause of the United States entering
the· World War:·.-:.
· "Th:e:_rules of -maritini'e warfare require a naval vessel desiring
to invest'i gate ·a mercha-nt . ship first to _warn her by firing a shot
acro's s :tle:r·· b~ow, ·oi in ··other ways, and then proceed with the exam1hatlot10 o'f· :her-1 ~haracter, make the decision in regard to her~
-~~
~.
seizure, place a prize crew on her, and, except .under certain exceptionable circumstances, bring her to port, where she may be
corid~i:hheditby a prize court. ' .
'' The"ruies of procedure (1917) as laid down for United States:
naval v:e ssels wlu:~n exercising the right of visit and search make·
no exception in favor of the submarine. In the early part of the·
w 'o rld War the German sutimarines exercised t.his right· of visit
and search in the ·same manner as surface vessels. When sunk,.
the papers and crew of merchant ships so visited were · saved.
Later. when the cases came up in a German prize court sitting:
·.
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on appeal at Berlin, the responsibility of the German Government
was often acknowledged and indemnities paid. When unlimited
submarine warfare commenced, in some cases where necessary
evidence was produced by the owners making claim in the prize
court, the court decid~d that the matter was outside the pale of
the prize regulations, though it did not deny the justice of the
clain1.
"Assuming that a merchant ship may be halted by a submarine in a legitimate fashion, it becomes difficult because of
limited personnel for the submarine to complete the inspection,
place a prize crew on board, and bring her into port. It is also
difficult for her to take the passengers and -crew of a large prize
on board should circumstances warrant sinkirig the vessel. However, these remarks are applicable to small surface crafts as \veiL
"During the "\Vorld War, on account of the vulnerability of the
submarine and on account of the probability of its sinking the
vessels it captured, the tendency was for all merchant ships (including neutrals) to arm themselves against the submarine. Such
action greatly hampers the activity of the submarines and tends
toward illegal acts both by the merchant vessels and by the submarines. In other words, the general tendency of submarine
warfare against commerce, even though starting according to
accepted rules, was sharply .toward warfare unlimited by international law or any humanitarian rules. This was because the
vulnerability of the submarine led the Germans to assume and
declare she was entitled to special exemptions from the accepted
rules of warfare governing surface craft. The merchant ship
sank the submarine if it came near enough; the submarine sought
and destroyed the merchant ship without even a knowledge of
nationality or guilt.
"Submarines were largely responsible for the extensive arming
of merchant vessels, neutral and belligerent, during the "\Vorld
\Var. The average merchant vessel could not hope to arm effectively against enemy surface combatant vessels and ·as a rule
submits to -visit and search without resistance. Prospects of saving the ship and certainty of safety to personnel have caused
them to accept as the lesser risk the visit of belligerent surface
vessels. "\Vhen, however, as in the World War, they met a
belligerent submarine, with a strong probability of being sunk by
that submarine, the law of self-preservation operated, and the
merchant ship resisted by every means in· its power. Defensive
armament was almost sure to be used offensively in an attempt
to strike a first blow. The next step was for each to endeavor
to sink the other on sight.
"'Var on commerce by surface combatant craft causes change
of ownership of merclwnt vessels only, provided the surface craft
does not sink these sbips, but these merchant vessels for the most
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part remain in service; they are not destroyed. The world does
not lose them. The object of war on commerce is not to destroy
shipping but to deprive the enemy of its use. Submarine warfare
on commerce, if unlimited in character, injures the enemy and
greatly injures the ·world as well. The world is so highly organized and so dependent on ocean transportation that shipping is
essential to livelihood; without it vast populations would starve.
"At present when war breaks out belligerent· vessels tend to
transfer to neutral flags and also to fly false flags. This hampers
lawful warfare by submarines, as owing to their great difficulty in
making the proper visit and search, it is thus impossible for them
to prevent belligerent commerce from going forward.
"The net results of unlimited submarine warfare in the World
War were (a) flagrant violations of international law, (b) destruction of an enormous amount of wealth, (c) unnecessary loss
of many innocent lives, and (d) to draw into the 'var many
neutrals.
"Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws
should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of submarines against merchant vessels both neutral and belligerent.
These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface
craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false
flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false
flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent an
enemy from running' amuck,' but immediately he does he outlaws
himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the wrath of
the world upon his head. If the submarine is required to operate
under the same rule as combatant surface vessels, no objection can
be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. The individual
.captains o.f submarines are no more likely to violate instructions
from their Government upon this point than are captains of any
other type of ship acting independently.
" Subn~ar·ines aga.inst combatant ships.-Against enemy men-ofwar the submarine may be likened to the advance guard on land,
which hides in a tree or uses underbrush to conceal itself. If the
infantry in its advance encounters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly,
even if it is not totally annihilated. However, an ambuscade is
.entirely legitimate. In the same fashion a submarine strikes the
·advancing enemy from concealment, and no nation cries out
against this form of attack as illegal. Its navy simply becomes
more vigilant, moves faster, and uses its surface scouts to protect itself.
" The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels ;
i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of
their use on surface craft and there can be none on submarines.
Submarines are particularly 'Yell adapted to use mines and torpedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being seen,
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lay their mines or discharge their torpedoes, and make their
escape.
" The best defense against them is eternal vigilance and high
spE:ed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater
we~lT to the machinery.
The continual menace of submarines in
the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets ·the
enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple
matter.
"The submarine as a man-of-war has a very vital part to play.
It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against
combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but it must be
required to observe th~ prescribed rules of surface craft when
opposing merchantmen as at other times.
"The subntarine a8 a scout.-As a scout the submarine has
great possibilities. It is the one type of vessel able to proceed
unsupported into distant enemy waters and maintain itself to
observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal
handicaps are poor habitability and lack of radio~ power to transmit its information. However, these may be overcome in some
degree in the future. Here, again, the submarine has come to
stay-it has great value, a legitimate use, and no nation can
decry its employment in this fashion."
Then followed a statement of the proposal of the United
States for limitation of naval armament so far as submarines
are concerned, as made at the opening session of the conference.
The report then continued:
"A nation possessing a great merchant marine, protected by
a strong surface navy, naturally does not desire the added threat
of submarine warfare brought against it. This is particularly
the case if that nation gains its livelihood through overseas commerce. If the surface navy of such a nation were required to
leave its home waters it would be greatly to its advantage if the
submarine threat were removed. This could be accomplished by
limiting the size of tte submarine so that it \Vould be restricted
to defensive operation in its own \Vaters. On the other hand,
if a nation has not a large merchant marine, but is dependent
upon sea-borne commerce from territory close abroad, it \vould
be necessary to carry war to her. It \Vould be very natural for
that nation to desire a large submarine force to protect the approaches on the sea and to attack troop transports, supply ships,
etc., of the enemy. C01hrol of Lhe surface of the sea only by
the attacking power would not eliminate it from constant ex-posure and loss hy submarine attacks.
" The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake·
unlimited submarine warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of
the people would bring about the downfall of the administration•
whieh attempted to SRnction its use. However, submarines act-
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ing legitimately from bases in our distant possessimis ·would
harass and greatly disturb an enemy attempting operations
against them. They might even delay the fall of these possessions until our fleet could assemble and commence major operations.
'' It ·will be impossible for our fleet to protect our two long
coast lines properly at all times. Submarines located at bases
along both coasts will be useful as scouts and to attack any
enemy ·who should desire to make raids. on exposed positions.
"The submarine is particularly an instrument of ·weak naval
powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the surface
of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface prefers
to rely on that superiority, while navies comparatively weak may
but threaten that dominance by developing a new form of attack
to attain success through surprise. Hence submarines have offered and secured advantages until the method of successful counterattack has been developed.
"The United States Navy lacks a proper number of cruisers.
The few we have ·would be unable to cover the necessary area to
obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them, as
they can not be driven in by enemy scouts.
"The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of submarines
fully manned and ready is about $30,000,000. For the 'vork which
will be required of them in an emergency this cost is small 'vhen
taken in connection with the entire Navy. The retention of a
large submarine force may at some future time result in the
United States holding its outlying possessions. If these colonies
once fall, the expenditure of n1en necessary to recapture them vvill
be tremendous, and may result in a drawn war, which 'vould
really be a United States defeat. The United States needs a large
submarine force to protect its interests.
"The committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited warfare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right
of visit and search, must be exercised by submarines under the
same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limitation
in size of submarines."
The chairman stated that he had deemed it his duty to. read the
foregoing report, which, as he ha-d already said, represented the
vie,vs of the Advisory Committee that had been created by the
President for the very purpose of giving to the American delegation such aid. The American delegation would most carefully
consider the able address of Lord Lee and would consult the
American naval experts.
1\lr. Sarraut said that he thought that the very interesting discussion to which the committee had been listening might well be
postponed until the next day. Lord Lee had set forth the British
views on the subn1arine question; he (M. Sarraut) had replied
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by outlining the divergent French views, and the chairman had
presented the American thesis in an interesting and voluminous
document. He could testify to . the profound interest aroused
among the French delegation by Lord Lee's speech and to the
force of his arguments, which if not convincing were highly im~
pressive. He ( 1\Ir. Sarraut) and his colleagues felt that the best
tribute which they could pay to Lord Lee's able address would be
to -reply to it in detail. He requested, therefore, that time might
be given to prepare this reply and also secure a translation of the
document presented by the chairman, and that the meeting be
adjourned until Friday afternoon.
The chairman asked what was the pleasure of the ·committee in
this matter.
1\Ir. Balfour said that he placed himself in the chairman's hands.
After some discussion it was agreed to meet Friday afternoon,
December 23, 1921, at .3 p. m., and that the statement to the
press should embody such portions of the remarks made at the
present sessions as the respective delegates shm;tld communicate
to the secretary general.
The meeting then adjourned until December 23, 1921, 3 p. m.

SIXTH MEETING-FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1921, 3 P. M.
PRESENT.

United States.-Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by :Mr.
:\Yright, 1\Ir. Clark.
British En~pire.-1\lr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Aul\_land Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir .. Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zea~
land), 1\Ir. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Han~
key, Capt. Little, Capt Domvile, Mr. Mousley.
France.-l\Ir. Sarraut, J.\tlr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by l\Ir. I{ammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal,
l\Ir. Ponsot.
JtaZy.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi~Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton. Accompanied by Marquis ViscontiVenosta, Count Pagliano, Comm~nder Prince Ruspoli, l\lr. Celesia
di Vegliasco.
Japan.-Prince Tokugawa, J.\tlr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral I{ato,
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. .
The secretary general~ assisted by 1\lr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont,
and 1\Ir. \Vilson.
Interpreters, 1\Ir. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon.

